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CORRECTIONAL MENTAL HEALTH LAW & POLICY:
A PRIMER
Fred Cohen*
Correctional mental health resides in a legal policy and administrative domain
of its own. Persons who are in penal captivity as arrestees, detainees, or sen1
tenced offenders are owed a basic duty of care that flows either from the Eighth
2
Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment or the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Persons who are in some fashion civilly committed based on their impaired
mental health and "dangerousness" may or may not possess a constitutional right
to treatment. In my reading, the Supreme Court of the United States has never
4
unequivocally found a constitutional right to treatment for the civilly committed.
5
Indeed, in Kansas v. Hendricks the Court upheld the indefinite commitment of
"so-called" sex predators; individuals who suffer a mental disorder, are found to
6
be dangerous, and are not amenable to treatment. The Hendricks decision then

becomes a handmaiden to a virulent form of preventive detention and to the
conversion of a civil process into a criminal-like sentence for a status.
Shifting our focus for the moment from various forms of deprivation of liberty,
let me briefly survey mental health treatment as it exists in the community. As
John Petrila brilliantly points out in a recent work, there has been a profound
7
change in the treatment of persons with mental illness since 1970. No, he does

not mean the demise of Freudian psychoanalytical principles and the triumph of
behaviorism and psychopharmacology. Rather, Petrila refers to the dramatic

change in the role of government. Services formerly provided by government
Professor Emeritus of Law & Criminal Justice, SUNY at Albany, author of THE MENTALLY
Executive Editor, CorrectionalMental Health Report and Juvenile CorrectionalMental Health Report. Author may be contacted at fredlaw97@aol.com.
1 See DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
2 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
3 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). This decision halted a trend to extend greater constitutional protections to detainees and is the basic citation to support Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment parallelism in the area of law under discussion.
4 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). This decision exhibits as close as the Court
came in completely addressing this matter; see Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp 1078 (E.D. Wisc.
1972). This is one of the leading lower court decisions finding that there is a right to treatment.
5 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
6 See Robert A. Burt, Promises to Keep, Miles To Go: Mental Health Law Since 1972, in THE
EVOLUTION OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW, ch. 1 ( Lynda E. Frost & Richard J. Bonnie eds. 2001). Burt
decries the current inhospitality of the federal courts to people with disabilities. There was an activist
moment in time when people truly in need were made visible and extended promises of care.
7 John Petrila, From Constitution to Contracts.Mental Disability Law at the Turn of the Century,
in THE EVOLUTION OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW, ch. 4 (Lynda E. Frost & Richard J. Bonnie eds. 2001).
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directly now have been privatized. The public mental health system has been
transformed in many states. Indeed, the freestanding mental health agency no
longer exists in many states. The states' designated Medicaid agency often controls mental health policy.
Petrila's most important point for our purposes, however, is that constitutional
principles no longer dominate mental disability law in the open community. The
1960's challenges to commitment procedures, a right to treatment and a right to
refuse treatment, have been superseded by contract-like questions: Am I covered? For how long? Suppose I am an alcoholic, can I get help? Does my insurance move with me? Where is this supposed safety-net?
As I indicated at the outset, correctional mental health is different; it rests on a
footing of constitutional obligation that initially is based on custody alone. That
is, there is no debate resembling the 1960's mantra of "You can't confine me if
you don't treat me." There are, of course, some debates. The right to treatment
in penal captivity is no open ticket to care on demand. When obtained, it is not a
right to the best care, the clinician or treatment modality of choice, or the locus of
care. Like so much of prisoner's rights law, this right to mental health treatment
resides at the outer edge of our notions of civilized decency. It most assuredly is
not a "best practices" or even "community standards" level of care.
Corrections is hardly a consumer-driven institution and the federal courts today are in no mood to be accused of spawning socialized medicine for those, in
Jeremy Bentham's words, who are least [socially] eligible.
What follows is a guide, a primer if you prefer, to the basic legal issues in
correctional mental health laws. It is a roadmap of major arteries and not a
Global Positioning System (GPS). For those who desire or require a GPS, I refer
you to the book from which most of this material is derived: Fred Cohen, The
Mentally DisorderedInmate and the Law, (Civic Research Institute, Inc., 1998).8
THE OBLIGATION OF BASIC CARE

Having physical custody of another person, as I have indicated, invariably creates a legal duty to care for that person, while the legal basis for the actual custody determines the particular care required. And one wonders how it could be
otherwise in a mostly civilized society that adheres to a rule of law. Custody in
penal confinement is sufficiently complete that prisoners must depend on their
keepers for food, water, clothing, and medical care, the basic stuff of survival.
There are very few shopping opportunities and even fewer private clinicians
available for prison or jail house calls. Parenthetically, officials likely would deny
such clinicians entry should they appear at the gates.
8 A cumulative supplement for 2003-04 is to be available early in 2003. The book and supplement are available from Civic Research Institute, Inc., 4490 U.S. Rt. 27, PO Box 585, Kingston, NJ
08528 or CivRes@aol.com.
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Phrased somewhat differently, the most fundamental obligation of a prison
system to those in its charge, indeed, of any system that confines persons, is to
maintain their life and health. Corrections officials would define that duty as to
provide for the security of staff and inmates. This obligation of basic care now
clearly includes the physical and psychological dimensions of the person and has
moved from the exclusive domain of private contract or tort law to include the
public domain of constitutional law. That is, we are in an era where inmates'
right to basic decency and protection as well as medical and psychological care
has moved from private legal actions to constitutionally based legal actions. This
is not the era of origin nor is it an era where inmates' rights are viewed
expansively.
Preservation of Life and Health
At the outset, a major distinction must be established as to the type of care
owed an inmate. When the law insists, as it does, that an inmate be provided with
basic shelter, food, water, clothing, and insulation from known inmate predators,
the objective is to preserve physical integrity, health and life. All inmates (or
penal captives) are entitled to the minimal conditions necessary to sustain life and
avoid needless suffering.
This duty, the preservation of life and health, resembles the duty to provide
medical and psychological care but it is also more expansive. Prison officials, for
example, must take preventive measures against predators to protect prospective
victims. The duty to the victim is not to provide relief from a physical or psychological malady, it is to prevent the infliction of harm. Keeping inmates adequately warm, clothed, and fed are similarly protective rather than regenerative.
As we shall see, the affirmative duty to provide medical or psychological care
and the duty to protect inmates both flow from the Eighth Amendment's ban on
9
cruel and unusual punishment. Indeed, in Farmer v. Brennan, the Supreme
Court recently clarified the meaning of "deliberate indifference" in the context of
a failure to prevent a rape of an inmate. Deliberate indifference is central to the
duty to provide care as well and Farmer, then, will apply to both duties. In the
ensuing brief discussion of custodial suicide as well as the use of physical restraints, we will encounter judicial confusion over the duty of care and the duty of
protection.' °
Medical and Psychological Care
The duty to provide medical or psychological care most clearly arises at the
point where an inmate is known to be ill or injured. When that condition is a
9 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
10 FRED COHEN, THE MENTALLY DISORDERED INMATE AND THE LAW, ch. 14,
(1998) (dealing with suicide).
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recognizable and serious psychiatric disorder, the Eighth Amendment's ban on
cruel and unusual punishment kicks in. The duty to provide medical or psychological care is preventive and ameliorative; and emphatically includes an obligation to relieve pain, prolong life, and stabilize (if not cure) the malady. Indeed,
the avoidance of gratuitous suffering is at the core of the constitutional
obligation.
The Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment has
been interpreted to require that state and federal prison officials must avoid deliberate indifference to the serious medical and psychological needs of inmates."1
This less-than-demanding duty places the constitutional obligation of care a notch
below the general standards of reasonableness for determining medical malpractice. What must be stressed, however, is that while constitutional minima may be
met, state officials may still be liable civilly for what is the equivalent of malpractice in the omission or provision of medical or psychological care. In other words,
meeting minimal federal requirements is no guarantee that officials responsible
for medical and psychiatric care may not be liable under state law. Since existing
state law varies greatly on standards of liability, it is incumbent on attorneys,
mental health workers and correctional officials to ascertain the law of their
jurisdiction.
The essence of the Eighth Amendment is an obligation of government to avoid
the needless infliction or prolongation of pain and suffering. Courts well understand that prisons are not likely to be models of comfort or free from damaging
stress and conflict. Psychological stress and possible deterioration often are accepted as an inherent aspect of imprisonment and thus beyond the realm of legal
protection. Whatever the source or cause - self-inflicted, inflicted by others, or
"natural" - there exists the legal duty to identify and treat inmates with serious
mental disorders.
There are two critical phrases in the statement of the legal obligation of care
owed a mentally disordered inmate: "deliberate indifference" and "serious medical needs." Unfortunately, there is no single, authoritative definition for what
constitutes a serious medical condition or mental health condition but it is possible to distill a workable understanding from a number of leading decisions. As
noted earlier, Farmer v. Brennan now provides us with an authoritative, reasona12
bly clear definition of deliberate indifference.

11 This article does not document all specific statements such as the one to which this footnote
is attached. The reader will find citations to the cases noted here and complete documentation in the
author's book cited supra note 10.
12 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
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DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE

"Deliberate indifference" is an awkwardly phrased mental state in the same
general category as "intention," "reckless," or "negligence." From its earliest use
in 1976, it was clear that it required more than poor judgment and something less
than intentional acts or omissions calculated to cause needless suffering. After
letting the lower courts grapple with its meaning for some eighteen years, in
Farmer v. Brennan the Court engaged in its first effort to define the seemingly
oxymoronic term.
Justice Souter stated, "With deliberate indifference lying somewhere between
the poles of negligence at one end and purpose or knowledge at the other, the
courts of appeals have routinely equated deliberate indifference with recklessness." 13 Recklessness, however, does not have a single meaning in law. Once the
Court decided on recklessness as the functional equivalent of deliberate indifference, it then had to choose between the civil standard and the criminal standard.
Civil versus Criminal Recklessness
Under civil law, most often tort law, a person is reckless when he or she acts,
or fails to act when there is a duty to do so, in the face of a high risk of harm
which is known or should have been known. Under the criminal law, however,
recklessness may be found only where the accused is found to have acted or
failed to act with actual knowledge of the particular risk. Obviously, the major
hurdle here is whether there is a duty to inquire and ascertain facts relevant to
actual risks.
For example, in the area of custodial suicide, a credible threat to commit suicide coupled with knowledge of a recent attempt would establish actual knowledge of the risk. On the other hand, a general awareness of risk factors might
qualify for "should have known" but would likely flunk the "actual knowledge"
test.
The Court in Farmer opted for the criminal law version of recklessness but
softened the potentially harsh impact on prisoners by noting that a claimant need
not show that an official actually believed that some harm actually would occur,
only that there was knowledge of a substantial risk of harm. Thus, the first question on liability is what was known (in Farmer,that the rape victim was obviously
homosexual). One then asks, what risks flow from that knowledge (here, sexual
assault); what duty is thereby established (protection); and was that duty
breached (possibly).

13

Farmer,511 U.S. at 835-6.
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Effect on Intake Screening
What then is Farmer's possible impact on the mentally ill? The most crucial
question is whether Farmer'sactual knowledge requirement obviates the need to
do intake screening and evaluation. It might be asked theoretically why should
correctional officials seek out the knowledge (e.g., prior suicide attempts, hospitalizations, or use of psychotropic medication) that may create the duty to do
more? It then would be argued that officials should deal only with clear manifestations of mental illness as inmates "come in the door" or where the illness
plainly erupts later.
First, I know of no jurisdiction that consciously has adopted such an approach.
Indeed, more and more correctional systems are using refined multi-level techniques for screening and evaluating persons in need of mental health care or at
special risk of committing suicide.
Second, the above comment may be said to beg the question: suppose a system
actually did abandon intake screening? The argument in response that should be
made is given the high percentage of inmates known to be experiencing serious
mental illness, there is actual knowledge of high risk among the entire population. Just as not all feminine-appearing inmates will be sexually assaulted, the
risks to that group are such that a special duty of care arises. The risks of a large
number of seriously mentally ill persons arriving at any given prison are high, the
14
duty then is to engage in individual detection, diagnosis, and appropriate care.
Third, at a policy level, a "see no evil" approach is inhumane and ultimately
more expensive when preventable deterioration leads to a more serious condition
which, in turn, may lead to injury or hospitalization, by far the most expensive
arena for treatment.
Fourth, recent courts seem more intent on constitutionalizing a duty to do intake classification for housing-security purposes. To condemn random doublecelling assignments, as courts do, for example, is also to condemn a "blinkers on"
approach to screening for mental illness.
SERIOUS NEEDS

What is or is not a "serious" medical /psychological need suffers from the same
lack of precision as the "deliberate indifference" standard. However, the seriousness component has not received an authoritative Supreme Court decision. This
requires reaching some understanding of this important concept through a distillation of leading decisions. The test for seriousness begins with clinical (or medical) necessity and not simply what may be desired. Because the constitutional
14 This analogy is far from perfect. Feminine-appearing inmates are, of course, a discrete class.
Those with mental illness do not similarly display "class membership" and, thus, must be sought and
identified. Knowing that one or two of every ten inmates will be entitled to care, it may be argued,
creates the duty.
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basis for the right to treatment is in the Eighth Amendment's ban against cruel
and unusual punishment, courts tend to equate seriousness with the needless infliction or endurance of pain and suffering. Clearly then, such minor ailments as
mild anxiety, depression, or headaches are not within the judicial parameters for
seriousness. Insisting on care for mild depression becomes the constitutional
equivalent of demanding cosmetic surgery.
On the other hand, a debilitating clinical depression where an inmate is virtually immobilized and is not attendant to even basic hygienic needs almost certainly would qualify. In the wake of a major lawsuit, the Michigan Department of
Corrections adopted a definition which may commend itself to other jurisdictions
and which clearly meets legal criteria:
Serious mental illness (or severe mental disorder) means a substantial disorder of thought or mood, which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of
life.
A serious/severe mental state or condition (1) manifested by substantial discomfort, pain, and/or disability that cannot be legitimately ignored by appropriate clinical staff, (2) requires a mental health assessment, diagnostic
evaluation, treatment planning and disposition planning, and (3) is generally associated with (a) the inability to attend to and effectively perform the
usual/necessary activities of daily living, (b) extreme impairment of coping
skills, rendering the patient exceptionally vulnerable to unintentional or intentional victimization and possible mismanagement and/or (c) behaviors
that are dangerous to self and others.
Serious mental illness/severe mental disorder includes psychiatric conditions/states that span the entire diagnostic spectrum of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) - III and is not limited to specific diagnosis. 15
15 This definition appears in the "Comprehensive Mental Health Plan" of June 6, 1986, submitted to Judge Enslen in USA v. Michigan, No. G84-63CA (W.D. Mich.). The Plan's pages are not
numbered, thus making more precise citation impossible. The first paragraph of the definition is
drawn from ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, Standard 7-10.1(b). The DSM-III reference is to the AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980). A somewhat different approach was
taken in Dunn v. Voinovich, Case No. C1-93-0166 (S.D. Ohio 1993). Section VIII of the Consent
Decree in Dunn includes the following definition:
Serious mental illness means a substantial disorder of thought or most which significantly
impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality or cope with the ordinary demands
of life within the prison environment and is manifested by substantial pain or disability. Serious mental illness requires a mental diagnosis, prognosis and treatment, as appropriate, by
mental health staff. It is expressly understood that this definition does not include inmates
who are substance abusers, substance dependent, including alcoholics and narcotic addicts, or
persons convicted of any sex offense, who are not otherwise diagnosed as seriously mentally
ill.
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DUTY

TO DIAGNOSE

However minimal the constitutional duty of treatment, important ancillary (or
supportive) rights and duties are thereby created. The right to treatment, at least
for serious disorders, would be meaningless without an additional, and anterior,
duty to provide diagnosis, and this duty to diagnose sweeps more broadly than
the underlying right to care. More inmates must necessarily be examined rather
than treated unless one makes the absurd assumption that all inmates eligible for
diagnosis (or screening and evaluation) somehow are also seriously mentally ill.
All jail and prison systems must have some screening, evaluation and classification or diagnostic system. This is a duty also owed the healthy inmate who has
a right not to be disturbed or injured, let us say, by a violent, psychotic inmate.
The seriously disturbed inmate, in turn, has a right to be identified for treatment
so that the needless continuation of pain and suffering-and that should include
preventable deterioration-is avoided.
Every prison system should have in place a regular screening and evaluation
process, adequately staffed with qualified personnel, where the information and
conclusions developed are used and periodically reviewed. Any system that can
be evaluated on the factors just noted and pass need not worry about a successful
legal challenge to this aspect of their mental health care. However, the cases
reveal that the more glaringly deficient the classification-diagnostic system, the
more sweeping the judicially mandated or endorsed relief. Indeed, where a system seems utterly primitive in treatment and classification resources, judges have
been inclined to mandate diagnostic information more clearly related to rehabilitation and education than the more restrictive right to treatment.
A number of federal courts have insisted that prisons deficient in classification
or diagnostic systems prepare plans to learn about the inmates' skills, background, or psychological difficulties. They have ordered large scale and expensive epidemiological studies and insisted that mental health specialists be
involved in this process and that certain standardized tests be used.
Thus, glaringly deficient prison systems have invited some federal judges to
require programs and penal objectives they would not likely impose if the particular claim (rehabilitation, for instance) was made in isolation or if the overall
prison conditions were minimally acceptable. The point is, the greater the deficiency, the more extensive the likely relief. It is difficult to imagine a constitutionally acceptable correctional mental health care system that inherently breaks
down at the front door.
This particular section was the subject of more pre-Decree negotiation than any other provision in the 33 page Decree. The definition section also describes the class in Dunn and, thus,
actually establishes who is eligible for mandatory treatment.
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RECORDS

The basic right to treatment for serious disorders has spawned not only a right
to diagnosis-classification but also a right to the maintenance of minimally adequate clinical records. Records are necessary for continuity of care, for review of
the efficacy of care, future diagnosis, and certainly to respond to questions raised
about the legal obligation to provide mandated care. Courts that have decided
challenges to a facility's record keeping have looked for a written plan for future
treatment, how well the files are organized, notations as to physical and mental
examinations, progress notes, medical history, and, certainly, medication records.
Mental health professionals, and especially psychiatrists, move in and out of
correctional systems. Inmates are subject to frequent transfers. Where records
are incomplete, inconsistent, or simply barren, continuity of care is severely compromised. Indeed, in my own experience in monitoring correctional mental
health care systems, considerable time was spent reviewing patients' charts which
were quite often in shambles. Individual treatment plans will be missing, progress notes absent, reasons for medication omitted, and even records on certain
lab testing where such testing involves life-threatening situations (e.g., lithium
levels) will be absent. When the records are so deficient, one certainly has grave
overall doubts about the efficacy of treatment.
Where a clinician's notes are lucid and reasonably comprehensive and the
course of future treatment clear, the legal demands here likely will be met.
Clearly, if any administrator has doubts about the medical records system the
time to have a professional evaluation is now and not with the plaintiffs' lawyers
looking over your shoulders.
Curiously, courts are divided on whether access by fellow inmates to such
records is legally permissible. As a matter of policy, one should condemn the
practice on the grounds of privacy and the potential for corrupt usage.
COMPONENTS OF A TREATMENT PROGRAM

Minimal Components
It is difficult, although not impossible, to predict what may be constitutionally
acceptable for inmate mental health care, diagnosis, and records. Six legally acceptable components, as articulated first in Ruiz v. Estelle,16 a landmark decision
involving the Texas Department of Corrections, provide a very useful initial guide
to a solution:
1. First, there must be a systematic program for screening and evaluating
inmates in order to identify those who require mental health treatment;
16

503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982).
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2.

Second, as was underscored in other cases, treatment must entail more
than segregation and close supervision of the inmate patients;
3. Third, treatment requires the participationof trained mental health professionals, who must be employed in sufficient numbers to identify and
treat in an individualized manner those treatable inmates suffering from
serious mental disorders;
4. Fourth, accurate, complete, and confidentialrecords of the mental health
treatment process must be maintained;
5. Fifth, prescriptionand administrationof behavior-alteringmedications in
dangerous amounts, by dangerous methods, or without appropriate supervision and periodic evaluations, is an unacceptable method of
treatment;
6. Sixth, a basic program for the identification, treatment, and supervision
of inmates with suicidal tendencies is a necessary component of any
mental health treatment program.
Desirable Components
It is useful to compare this guide to what may be minimally acceptable with a
set of factors I have prepared that may be described as ideal or at least
comprehensive:
1.

2.

3.

Diversion of Selected Offenders with Mental Illness. There is a virtual
unanimity in the literature and among experts that too many prisoners
with serious mental illness are swept into jail and prison, and often for
minor offenses. A progressive system would provide legal authorization for pre-trial examinations and diversion to treatment where
17
appropriate.
Identificationof Inmates with Mental Illness Entering the System. Unless the system has in place mechanisms to identify those needing care,
either at reception or after confinement, it simply cannot meet its
treatment obligations. Better systems will have a computerized classification and tracking system.
Identificationfor appropriatecare of those inmates suffering from alcoholism, drug addiction, some form of sexual dysfunction, or problems
associated with the "Battered Woman Syndrome." These conditions
generally fall outside of legally mandated care. However, a correctional system that is "full service" is responsive to these impaired individuals, and that in itself is deemed desirable. Compliance with basic
constitutional requirements, as noted, would encompass only the seri-

17 See Brian D. Shannon, Diversion of Offenders with Mental Illness: Recent Legislative Reforms, 59 Tex. B.J. 330 (1996).
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ously mentally ill. However, a comprehensive system would have a
fully integrated system and not draw artificial distinctions between
"special needs" categories.
Training of staff on the signs and symptoms of mental disorder and
those inmates with "special needs." The identification of those who
need care does not end at the front door, nor is it limited to mental
health specialists. Security staff, especially those assigned to mental
health special care units and to segregation units, must be able to identify those who need care and understand the behavior associated with
the condition or any medications involved. Such training should be
subjected to rigorous evaluation of the information conveyed, attitudes changed and behavior changed.
5. Adequate (in quantity and quality) human resources available for the
various tasks associated with mental health treatment. Mental health
staff should be appropriately licensed, multi-disciplined and function
administratively in an integrated fashion. Staffing ratios for psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, and others should be established at
least as a rough guide for judging the objective quality of a system.
Opportunities will exist for staff development and enrichment. "Burn
out" and "dry out" seem endemic to staff members in this highly
charged work area and comprehensive programs will provide opportunities for growth and respite.
6. Adequate (in quantity and quality) physical resources available. Obviously, a certain amount of physical space designed for various treatment or program objectives must be available. The available space
should be designed to meet the need for hospitalization; longer term
care needs not necessitating hospitalization; crisis care (e.g., suicidewatch placements); transitional care units; and, perhaps, a special
needs unit (housing, e.g., the dual-diagnosed inmate). A "least restrictive environment" approach would suggest enhanced concern for the
inmates' needs.
7. Access to Care. Without ready access to diagnosis and care, human
and physical resources become virtually meaningless. This calls for a
study of waiting lists, responses to "kites," knowledge by security staff
and inmates on how to gain access to care, appropriate training and
orientation of inmates on gaining such access. From the standpoint of
actually auditing a system, access must be evaluated on site. Cells,
beds, and staff may be counted but access is a dynamic concept and
must be observed. A model system would perform regular audits;
question inmates and staff; assess the orientation process and even do
emergency "trial runs." In evaluating access to care, one necessarily
also evaluates the relationship between security and mental health
4.
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8.

9.

10.

11.

staff. Without a collaborative approach, no system will function very
well.
Contents of Records. Records, as described earlier, are crucial to the
legal requirement of continuity of care. They are evidence of the care
and also instrumental in assuring its quality. As a barometer of quality,
the use of regular progress notes and a comprehensible individual
treatment plan will show whether appropriate care is given and will
make the personnel changes that are endemic to corrections less interruptive of the care process. The legal concern here is with continuity
of care. The mental health record is a necessary, although not sufficient, factor in meeting that obligation.
Medication Management. We must recognize that medication is the
treatment of choice for the mentally ill inmate. This means that there
should be reasonable access to the psychiatrist, a formulary that allows
access to the newer psychopharmacological agents that are emerging
at a rapid pace, and regular monitoring and testing. In systems with
rapid turnover or the use of locum tenens psychiatrists, special attention must be paid to medication practices, especially changes in
medication.
Restorative Opportunities. For the seriously mentally ill, medication
may well be the treatment of choice but it should not be the only treatment or programming available. For those not taking medication it is
even more important to have a full-range of activities, along with individual and group therapy. Comprehensive programs offer work opportunities along with structured physical activities, horticultural
programs, guide-dog training, vocational training and the like. Programs dealing with anger management and social skills, along with educational opportunities and the like, often enhance restorative
opportunities.
Management Information System (MIS). A model MIS should be

computerized and used for needs assessment, quality assurance and
tracking. Model programs will produce concrete examples of how the
MIS is used in the system.
12.

13.

Data/Researchon Treatment Outcomes. Comprehensive programs will

not be content to simply "build, hire and provide access." They will be
concerned with the articulation of treatment objectives and be engaged in acceptable research on outcomes. Articles in peer reviewed
publications would be extremely good evidence on this point.
Economy of Scale. The administrative and organizational structures
should be designed to provide the maximum care for the funds allocated. Are services regionalized or clustered? Are services shared
and accessible? Are actual costs actually known?
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14.

15.

16.

Policy Procedure: Contemporary, Comprehensive, Accessible. In the

interest of uniformity and consistency of practice, a system must have
contemporary policy and procedures that are readily available and understandable. Special attention should be paid to transfers from correctional settings to mental hospitals, forced medication, restraints and
isolation, disciplinary proceedings, confidentiality, consent, and suicide. These areas generate the most legal concern and have the clearest legal mandates.
Discharge Planning. A comprehensive care system should not end at
the institution's walls. Inmates needing care inside are not magically
going to not need care on their release. Discharge planning begins
inside, and appropriate community care, including medication and
housing arrangements, will be the hallmark of a comprehensive
system.
Quality Assurance Program. An ongoing internal survey, evaluation,

and feedback system accompanied by an evidentiary privilege to safeguard such studies from disruptive discovery demands should be part
of any sophisticated system.
To reiterate, the above sixteen factors are a combination of the legally required and the professionally desired. Anyone wishing to evaluate a correctional
mental health program might well use these factors as their guide. For attorneys
seeking to evaluate the merits of a case - particularly a class action challenge this list should be indispensable.
EVALUATION OF TREATMENT

There are essentially two approaches to evaluating the adequacy of treatment:
the objective and the subjective approach. An objective approach focuses on
such empirical items as inmate-staff ratios, available beds, the number of clinician-patient contacts, and so on. A subjective approach is primarily evaluative.
It asks about the quality of the services provided and expresses some concern for
outcomes. This approach, of course, may be, and often is, used in conjunction
with the objective approach.
Courts seem to prefer the objective approach, probably because it is easier to
work with. It is empirically demonstrable, standards are available, and expert witnesses can speak authoritatively as to needed numbers of personnel, clinicianinmate contact, beds, and so on. Of course, experts will also be relied on for their
subjective or qualitative judgments.
The term "treatment" in this context most often refers to efforts to provide
short-term relief from acute psychic distress. Treatment in the sense of forwardlooking, future-oriented improvement in, say, coping and social skills is not the
type of treatment referred to (or likely offered) here. Perhaps the most widely
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espoused correctional treatment objective is preparation for life in the prison's
general population. More recently, "preparation for release" is being used and
this objective is at once more difficult to achieve and more desirable.
SUBSTANCE

ABUSERS

The question of whether to treat substance abusers, and if so how, often arises
in the prison and jail setting. Indeed, we should pose the most fundamental question for this subsection and attempt to answer it squarely: do prison inmates have
a constitutional right to treatment for their alcoholism or drug addiction? Although there are some caveats to the answer, the basic answer is perhaps a surprising no.
This again is not a question that asks whether it would be good policy to treat
such persons or whether it would be humane, effective, and so on. The question
is asked only in terms of legal obligation and the answer is - no. The key to
understanding this answer lies in the fact that courts generally have not characterized alcoholism or drug addition as serious medical/mental health conditions.
Parenthetically, a drug reaction withdrawal may well be "serious" and require an
appropriate clinical intervention.
In rejecting a claim for alcohol treatment programs at New Jersey's Rahway
Prison the federal judge indicated that not every illness or injury is "serious." He
appeared to leave room for a claim that some substance abusers were seriously ill
but, like many of his judicial colleagues, he ultimately viewed the claim as one for
18
non-mandated rehabilitation.
There simply is no constitutional right to rehabilitation. If alcoholism and
drug addiction are viewed as a kind of status or condition, as opposed to disease,
then the claim is translated as one to rehabilitation and it is lost. It should also be
said that in a number of judicial proceedings a trial judge will order, or the parties
may enter into an agreement for, a substance abuse program. Among the sixteen
desirable factors previously listed is the treatment of such conditions in an integrated system.
A prison system may be found so deficient that the judge requires things that
are otherwise viewed as desirable and the government sees no point in challenging the requirement. This may help explain consent decrees that sweep more
broadly than constitutional minima. Thus, while there are examples of judiciallymandated substance abuse programs, they result from unusual aspects of the litigation or from agreement, and not from strict adherence to legal norms.

18 Pace v. Fauver, 479 F. Supp. 456 (D.N.J. 1979), affd, 649 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1981); see supra
note 15 for the Ohio approach to this matter.
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ISOLATION

Returning now to some specific problems encountered by jail and prisons in
dealing with their mentally disturbed inmates, the use of isolation often creates
legal entanglements. No case has been found that totally forbids isolation of the
mentally ill, even though some experts find its use, especially with suicidal inmates, counterproductive. Very recent litigation has posed this question dramati19
cally in the context of the supermax prison. Jones 'El v. Berge is the most
comprehensive judicial decision on point.
The inmate's mental condition is a crucial factor in determining whether the
overall conditions of isolation are cruel and unusual. Prison officials must be
especially judicious in their use of isolation (or other forms of temporary restraint) and be certain to follow local rules closely on such items as duration,
authorization, and monitoring. A "sentence" of some form of isolation by a disciplinary committee should take into account the likely impact on an inmate known
to be suffering with mental illness.
In assessing the likely quality of a prison's mental health services, the first
sickest inmates will be
place to visit is disciplinary segregation. This is where the
20
housed (hidden actually) with minimal or no treatment.
RESTRAINT

Restraint and seclusion are often joined for discussion and analysis in the literature and in various standards. By restraint I refer to the use of a mechanical
immobilizing device - typically and preferably leather padded wristlets and anklets - used during a crisis period to prevent injury to the individual and others.
Such restraints may never be used for punishment whether or not an inmate is on
a mental health caseload.
On the other hand, isolation is an acceptable form of punishment, as well as a
device to prevent injury for the mentally ill and for those who are not mentally ill.
When disciplinary segregation - or isolation - is imposed upon a mentally ill
inmate then there are special considerations involving the projected impact on
the inmate. There also is case law to support the notion that marginally acceptable conditions for those not mentally ill may be marginally unacceptable in light
of the known mental condition of certain inmates.
19 See Jones v. Berge, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (W.D. Wisc. 2001) and Jones 'El v. Berge, 164 F.
Supp. 2d 1096 (W.D. Wisc. 2001).
20 The New York State Department of Correctional Services is being challenged in a class action that focuses on the frequent and extended housing of inmates with mental illness in the Special
Housing Units (SHU).
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Challenges to Restraint

When the use of restraints is challenged, it is often analyzed as an alleged
application of excessive force. Looked at in this way, the problem falls within the
contours of Hudson v. McMillian,2 1 which holds that in order to constitute cruel
and unusual punishment the application of official force must involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. There is no "significant injury" requirement
but the mental element requirement is very difficult to prove. One must show
that force, here in the form of restraints, was applied for the very purpose of
causing pain or other harm. Thus, even a misguided or gratuitous strapping down
might not amount to constitutional injury.
The use of restraints on an inmate who is on the mental health caseload may
also be challenged as a variety of deliberate indifference to the treatment needs
of one who is seriously mentally ill. This approach then becomes a right to treatment-type claim and the deliberate indifference test is not as difficult for the
inmate to meet. At this juncture we need only note the possibility of parallel
claims and the need to approach restraints in a judicious manner with early medical involvement and close monitoring.
PRETRIAL DETAINEES

Pretrial detainees have at least the same right to diagnosis, adequate records,
treatment and other cognate rights as persons convicted of crime.2 2 Indeed, in
the hierarchy of legal rights retained by those in some form of penal confinement,
convicted prisoners occupy the lowest rung. It is safe to assume that the unconvicted detainee possesses whatever rights the convicted possess and is entitled to
at least the same level of care.
The source of the right to care for pretrial detainees, however, is not the
Eighth Amendment, but the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The distinction creates some interesting constitutional issues, but for present purposes the bottom line is the nature, rather than the specific source, of the right.
To repeat: detainees are entitled to at least the same level of care as the
convicted.
Pretrial detainees clearly present a different package of mental health
problems than convicted prisoners. Their stay is relatively brief; alcohol and drug
abuse problems abound; suicide is far more prevalent; examinations for trial may
be performed; and the initial shock of jailing is itself traumatic for many. Many
observers find that local jails may indeed be the only mental health resource
21 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
22 See MARTIN DRAPKIN, MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF JAIL INMATES
WITH MENTAL DISORDERS (1999), the best practical guide on point available.
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available to them. As mental hospitals close and community mental health facilities fail to keep pace, the jail seems always to be there.
Suffice it to say that the right to care (and protection) is there; it is at least as
demanding as the "deliberate indifference" standard which applies to the convicted; and jails must have ready access to diagnostic and treatment resources and
personnel. Long-term care will not likely be an issue but short-term, acute care,
detoxification issues, and the threat of suicide are dramatically involved.
Jails, especially smaller, more rural facilities, probably are more vulnerable to
successful lawsuits than most prisons. Many jail administrators simply hope they
won't be sued or studied; they actually have no acceptable arrangements for
mental health care. The newly invigorated diversion movement, however, may
be the jail's best friend.
SUICIDE

Suicide, of course, is not a problem that is confined to jails although about four
times as many suicides occur in jails as in prisons. The risk of suicide is sufficiently greater in the jail setting that every jailer must immediately confront the
phenomenon as a problem of appropriate care, surveillance, and custody. In reviewing lawsuits that have resulted from custodial suicide, the following questions
emerge:
Did the facility have the basic capacity to respond to the problem?
How many staff were in place and how were they trained?
Is the structure of the facility itself a contributory factor?
How well did staff respond to the threat posed, for example, by a highly
intoxicated or highly agitated detainee?
5. How closely was the at risk person monitored?
1.
2.
3.
4.

6.

Exactly what steps, in compliance with what suicide protocols, were
taken to prevent the suicide?

7. Were clinical personnel involved andif not, why not, and if so, when and
how?
These questions are not exhaustive but they are highly representative. Jails
confine a highly diverse population and often receive people who are in an extreme, albeit temporary, emotional condition. It is incumbent on jailers to initially screen and provide humane and protective care for the potential suicide.
This, of course, is crisis intervention in its most basic form and not a commitment
of resources to long-term care.
It would be misleading, even in a brief summary, to leave the impression that
custodial suicide cases pose major liability questions for custodians. Deliberate
indifference, with the Farmer standard of criminal recklessness as the mental requirement for constitutional liability, is difficult, indeed, to establish. Even where
an inmate was known to be suicidal and was placed in an inpatient psychiatric
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unit where he suffocated himself with a plastic bag, the reviewing court found no
deliberate indifference.2 3 Why? The clinical judgment of low risk was found
within professional judgment norms and, thus, there was not a strong likelihood
that a suicide would occur or, if so, would occur with that instrumentality.
THE MENTALLY RETARDED

The mentally retarded inmate presents a special package of problems that may
confound correctional administrators. Some mental health professionals believe
that the plight of the retarded inmate is even worse than that of a mentally ill
inmate. Retarded inmates often are gullible, vulnerable and too often victimized
and manipulated by fellow inmates.
At the outset, there is a serious question concerning just how a severely retarded person is able to negotiate the criminal justice system and end up in
prison. Persons who are severely retarded are likely to be incompetent to be
tried or enter a plea since they may not understand the criminal charges or be
able to assist counsel. Therefore, an inmate who is functionally impaired to the
point where a conviction is improper should not be in prison. But they are and
they often are dual diagnosed.
One recent study estimated that about 2 percent of our prison population is
retarded. On the other hand, some courts have found 10 to 15 percent of the
prison population to be retarded. Persons who are severely or profoundly retarded simply should not be in prison and if they are, there is a failure somewhere
along the way in the system.
With problems ranging from exploitation to the serving of longer terms, no
one seems to deny the plight of this group of people. Do the mentally retarded
have a constitutional right to treatment in prison? Unfortunately, the answer is
no. Do the mentally retarded have any special claims to help while imprisoned?
The answer is a guarded yes, grounded on a due process claim to physical safety
and freedom from undue restraints.
It is enough to say in this primer that the right to treatment in prison exists
within a disease or illness model. However, mental retardation is classified, it is
not a disease and inmates do not become retarded in prison. Their learning or
developmental disability may contribute to problems of adjustment in prison but
that, of course, is different than acquiring a condition in prison.
The mentally retarded are prime candidates for diversion from prison and,
once in prison, for programs designed to enhance their social and educational
skills, and to allow them to maximize their human potential. The claim to positive help, however, as opposed to special protective concerns, is not of the same
legal stature as that of the seriously mentally ill inmate.
23

See Estate of Max G. Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254 (7th Cir. 1996).
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TRANSFERS FOR TREATMENT

While all prisons and jails must provide basic treatment at least for the seriously disordered inmate, the choice as to the type of treatment and where it is
provided raises few, if any, legal questions. Discretion clearly exists as to the mix
of on-site and off-site medical and psychological services. However, when a prisoner appears to need care in a mental hospital and a transfer is contemplated,
then the Supreme Court's decision in Vitek v. Jones2 4 applies.
A Vitek-like situation arises when a decision is made that a particular prison
does not have the treatment resources or security appropriate to a seriously mentally disordered inmate. Correctional officials will seek a transfer to a mental
hospital and the inmate may seek to resist. This creates an adversary situation
and one in which the inmate has important procedural rights.
Quite simply, Vitek decided that the combination of additional stigma, a drastic alteration in the conditions of confinement, and being subjected to a
mandatory behavior-modification program created a protected liberty interest
traceable to the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
The following minimal due process safeguards are now constitutionally required by Vitek before such a transfer:
1. Written notice to the prisoner that a transfer to a mental hospital is
being considered.
2. A hearing sufficiently after the notice to permit the prisoner to prepare,
at which disclosure to the prisoner is made of the evidence being relied
on for the transfer and at which an opportunity to be heard in person
and to present documentary evidence is given.
3. An opportunity at the hearing to present testimony of witnesses by the
defense and to confront and cross-examine witnesses called by the state,
except upon a finding, not arbitrarily made, of good cause for not permitting such presentation, confrontation, or cross-examination.
4. An independent decision maker who need not come from outside the
prison or hospital administration.
5. A written statement by the fact-finder as to the evidence relied on and
the reasons for transferring the inmate.
6. Availability of "qualified and independent assistance," furnished by the
state, if the inmate is financially unable to furnish his own.
7. Effective and timely notice of all the foregoing rights.
Perhaps the most basic question relates to whether Vitek-mandated procedures
apply where the transfer is to a treatment facility administratively within the
prison system. The answer suggested here is that when a finding of mental illness
is a predicate for admission to a treatment facility, then the physical location and
24

445 U.S. 480 (1980).
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administrative responsibility should be irrelevant to Vitek's applicability. Indeed,
as more and more mental health services are provided by corrections - a clear
movement since Vitek was decided - such a result is necessary to give meaning to
the procedural safeguards the Court sought to provide.
Parenthetically, when such a transfer is for a relatively brief period of observation, then Vitek does not apply. In my experience, such transfers actually are
made because a diagnosis and "need to treat" decision will have been made at the
sending facility. It is also somewhat ironic that in practice the problem is not an
overreliance on hospitalization or the procedural accommodation of protesting
inmates. Protests are extremely rare and the problem more likely is gaining rapid
access to desperately needed care.
Finally, in Sandin v. Conner25 the Supreme Court recently adopted a radically
different approach to establishing the liberty interest it requires before procedural due process is mandated. Whatever impact Sandin will have on prison discipline, the Court specifically exempted Vitek transfers from its reach. Thus, Vitek
and its progeny remain "good law."
THE TREATMENT RELATIONSHIP

Confidentiality vs. InstitutionalSecurity
The treatment relationship in the institutional setting presents recurring and
profound legal questions regarding confidentiality and privilege, the duty to disclose when a clinician learns about a particular kind of danger and the problems
of consent to treatment. The need for confidentiality and privilege, as a matter of
law and professional ethics, rests on the individual's expectations of privacy and
nondisclosure along with recognition that the need for information in order to
provide needed treatment generally outweighs even compelling demands for disclosure. Where the relationship with the inmate is for diagnosis-evaluation-classification (or something similar), then the full impact of privilege and
confidentiality does not apply.
In Jaffe v. Redmond26 the Supreme Court determined that Rule 501 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which creates a psychotherapist-patient privilege rule,
was broad enough to encompass psychiatrists, psychologists, and licensed social
workers. The ruling preserved the confidentiality of a female police officer who
participated in some fifty counseling sessions with a licensed clinical social
worker who, in turn, refused to turn over notes on the demand of plaintiff's counsel in a wrongful death action.
25 515 U.S. 472 (1995). In the first few years of its existence, Sandin was discussed in perhaps
800 appellate decisions.
26 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
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While this is a surprisingly liberal view about the scope of the privilege, it must
be emphasized that the ruling applies only in the federal courts although it is
likely to have persuasive value in other jurisdictions. Justice Scalia wrote a scathing, indeed mocking, dissent expressing doubt about whether the privilege enhances treatment and he wondered why we do not also have a mother-child
privilege.
The mental health professional in a prison or mental hospital setting is well
advised to disclose his or her agency to the individual before proceeding, disclose
the purpose of the meeting, indicate the uses to which the information will or
may be put, and indicate a willingness to answer questions as concretely as possible concerning the risks of disclosure.
The really difficult problems for the clinician are to balance the generally applicable principle of confidentiality in a treatment relationship with the countervailing demands of security: the security of specific individuals who may be in
jeopardy and the general security of the institution. The treatment security issue
has become blurred as correctional officers increasingly become a part of the
treatment team.
When Confidentiality Does Not Apply

Every jurisdiction should adopt a clear set of rules as to when confidentiality is
inapplicable. One solution is to require mental health personnel to report to correctional personnel when they identify an inmate as one of the following:
" Suicidal
* Homicidal
* Presenting a reasonably clear danger of injury to self or to others either
by virtue of conduct or oral statements
* Presenting a reasonably clear danger of escape or the creation of internal disorder or riot
• Receiving psychotropic medication
" Requiring movement to a special unit for observation valuation or treatment of acute episodes
* Requiring transfer to a treatment facility outside the prison or jail
When a mental health professional has reason to believe that an inmate-patient presents a danger of violence to persons who are readily identifiable, a duty
arises to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim. This often is referred
to as a Tarasofj27 problem and the safest response would be for the clinician to
alert appropriate security personnel and allow them to implement security as
needed.
27

Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
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An even more difficult Tarasoff problem arises when an inmate with mental
illness is to be discharged having received the full criminal sentence, and there is
a belief that the person is dangerous. What action, if any, is required and does
this vary with the specificity of the person or persons who are endangered?
Some jurisdictions, Ohio among them, have adopted a rather progressive view
of the role of the correctional officer who interacts regularly with inmates suffering with mental illness. An officer assigned to the Residential Treatment Unit
will also be assigned to an inmate's treatment team and, thus, sit through sessions
where the most personal and sensitive material likely will be discussed.
The officer is not under any professional, ethical obligation to not gratuitously
disclose but certainly may be subject to employment-related sanctions or even a
civil suit for damages.2 8 The key, of course, is gratuitous disclosure of a medical
condition: the shouting down the cell block as to who has AIDS, harassing inmates about their psychotropic medications, or needlessly keeping the door open
during sensitive treatment sessions or meetings. With the added professionalism
comes an added responsibility to protect the medical privacy of inmates.
CONSENT

On the question of the need to obtain consent for various types of treatment,
there is a general formula which may be useful in developing an answer: the more
intrusive the treatment, the more likely the risk of permanent side effects and the
more experimental the procedure, the more likely the need to obtain consent.
Where informed consent is required, then the legal minima include a competent adult, the absence of duress or coercion, the disclosure of information on
risks, and the disclosure of information on the likely consequences of not accepting the proffered care. Inmates and detainees have gained considerable
ground in the effort to require consent either to various forms of psychotherapy
or drug therapy. Drugs that are intended to cause paralysis or vomiting as a part
of a behavioral modification program have been characterized as cruel punishment unless there is consent.
The Constitution does not forbid "cruel treatment," only cruel punishment.
Occasionally there will be a threshold argument concerning whether a particular
intervention is punishment or treatment. However, characterizing an intervention as treatment does not wholly insulate it from legal challenge. If a due process liberty interest or a First Amendment interest in religious freedom or
expression is implicated, then a constitutional barrier to the intended treatment
may be found.
28 Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 315 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating a right to privacy in prison for medical
information and records); but see Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733 (6th Cir. 1994).
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Again, the Sandin decision alluded to earlier does not impact existing decisions on the constitutional necessity for consent.2 9
THE FUTURE

Looking into the future, it would appear that the conservative tone established
by the present Supreme Court will prevail for the foreseeable future. Among
other things, this means that an inmate's basic constitutional right to minimal
physical and psychological care is not likely to be enriched or expanded. It also
means continued, and perhaps enhanced, deference to mental health professionals as to what is or is not appropriate diagnosis and care. And it surely seems
unlikely that more in the way of inmate consent to care will be required.
The basic legal framework for a mentally disordered inmate's claim to care
and services has been established and is not likely to be undone. However, it is
also unlikely that the Supreme Court will further cultivate those rights, although
some of the more liberal and activist federal district courts may continue to expand prisoners' rights. The substance and the direction of care for the mentally
disordered and mentally retarded inmate and detainee more likely will be determined by state and federal officials and by professionals seeking to expand and
improve prison and jail care.
Some legislative developments, particularly the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA) will likely have an impact on the availability of certain remedial measures now widely used in the federal courts.3 ° Under PLRA, consent decrees and
injunctive measures must rest on a finding of unconstitutional conditions; any
such remedies are severely limited by time. Fees for counsel and Masters are
quite limited, along with a host of other restraints.
I must emphasize that PLRA does not - and, indeed, under the restraints of
separation of powers could not - affect any of the substantive rights and duties
which are the subject of this article. Beyond that, where the Court has found a
liberty interest, for example, in the avoidance of the supposed stigma of mental
illness or unwanted psychotropic drugs and it has also mandated procedures ancillary to the right, then again PLRA does not, and could not, alter such
solutions.
Failure to accommodate the special needs of physically and mentally disabled
inmates may give rise to a statutory claim under the as yet largely unexploited
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 3 1 Most important is the ADA's prohibition against discrimination in services, programs, or activities. Inmates with a
29 See supra note 25.
30 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626.
31 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. See Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998);
Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356 (2001).

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

variety of physical disabilities are entitled to reasonable access or accommodation
and this has led to major architectural changes in prisons and the relocation of
certain activities from, for example, an upper floor to a ground level floor. There
is, however, no caselaw of any consequence dealing with the ADA and mentally
disordered inmates.
I have personally encountered instances where mental illness alone purportedly disqualified an inmate from a "boot camp" program or a particularly desirable housing or work situation. In each instance, when the matter was brought to
the attention of authorities, the policy was changed to require an individual decision on the program, job or housing and that appears to satisfy the intent of the
ADA.3 2 With prison and jail populations continuing to rise and bringing with
them a tide of additional inmates who are mentally ill, the problems addressed
here will only grow more severe. Ultimately, of course, a policy of selective diversion from the criminal justice system and of carefully coordinated reintegration into the community after a prison or jail term is far more desirable than what
we presently have.
The boundaries of constitutional obligation have been the boundaries of actual
physical custody. Some recent developments suggest that the DeShaney boundaries may not be as rigid as first appeared. The Ninth Circuit held in Wakefield v.
Thompson33 that the state of California must continue providing medical attention and medication even after release from prison. The medication and attention must be in sufficient quantity and quality to allow the released prisoner
reasonable time enough to consult a doctor and obtain a new supply once released. The court's rationale is that the duty of care while confined rests on the
premise that the inmate is unable to secure needed medical or mental health care
on his own behalf. The prisoner's ability unilaterally to secure medication is not
necessarily restored the instant he walks into the civilian world. 34 It may take
days or weeks, suggests the court, for the former inmate to secure medication.
While Wakefield factually appears limited to medication, conceptually it may
be argued that the court's reasoning applies as well to needed out-patient care,
residential care, continuing psychiatric or psychological counseling, or some form
of day care. 35 In Brad H. v. City of New York3 6 the plaintiffs filed a class action
32
33

See also The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 504, 794.
177 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 1999). The case is based on a continuing obligation under the Eighth

Amendment to provide mental health care.

34 Wakefield, 177 F.3d at 1163. The inmate was prescribed psychotropic medication by the
prison psychiatrist which a correction officer then allegedly refused to provide Wakefield on his
release.
35 See Releasing Inmate Without Medication May Violate Eight Amendment, XI CORRECTIONAL L. Rpt. 17 (1999).
36 729 N.Y.S.2d 348 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001), (referring to the Temporary Restraining Order but
dealing specifically with plaintiff's claim to receive discharge planning records of former inmates as
part of discovery).
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lawsuit in state court arguing that the City must provide discharge planning and
continuing community treatment to some 25,000 detainees and sentenced inmates
who annually receive mental health treatment in city jails. Plaintiffs based their
claims on state legislation and the state constitution and appeared to prove that
on release without continuing care plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury, which
is highly predictable and avoidable.3 7 Should Wakefield be expanded and Brad
H. successfully implemented, the walls created by DeShaney will be breached and
it is possible that sensible social policy and decent clinical practice would be employed rather than tortuous litigation to achieve those results.
At the front end of the system one must increasingly consider various devices
by which to divert more offenders with mental illness. One such device is the
mental health court pioneered in Broward County, Florida, as a division of the
criminal court.3 8 The court handles cases involving nonviolent misdemeanor defendants identified as mentally ill or retarded. The judge may order treatment
but has great difficulty enforcing the order. Facilities can, and do, refuse admis39
sion and without adequate community resources the court is powerless.
Whether a new court is needed to achieve diversion remains an open question.
The front line operatives here are the police who could be trained to avoid arrest
in the first place and thus avoid judicial involvement. According to Murphy's
groundbreaking work, police rely on informal guidelines and informal dispositions in managing encounters with the mentally ill." ° An officer's decision on
how to proceed will be guided by some combination of the following factors:
*
*
*
*

The type of incident or behavior involved;
The concerns of the complainant;
Characteristics of the subject, victims, complainant, and bystanders;
The relationship between complainant and subject (e.g., family, friend,
employer, stranger);
* Whether there is evidence of a crime;
* Legal criteria for emergency detention;
* Police agency policy, organizational structure, and resources;
37 See N.Y. TIMES Sept. 13, 1999, at A17 (discussing the TRO that was obtained by plaintiffs).
38 See Debra Baker, A One-of-a-Kind Court May Offer the Best Hope for Steering Nonviolent
Mentally Ill Defendants Into Care Instead of Jail, 84 A.B.A. J. 20 (1998).
39 There are plans to build a forensic mental health treatment center at a cost of about $13
million.
40 G.R. Murphy, Special Care: Improving the Police Response to the Mentally Disabled, POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM 63 (1986), reprintedin FRED COHEN, THE LAW OF
DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY 31 (1991). The Memphis, Tennessee police diversion project has
garnered high praise from experts in the field. See also HENRY J. STEADMAN, DENIS W. MCCARTY, JOSEPH P. MORRISSEY, THE MENTALLY ILL IN JAIL (1989) and recent
monographs by HENRY J. STEADMAN AND BONITA M. VEYSEY, PROVIDING SERVICES
FOR JAIL INMATES WITH MENTAL DISORDERS (1997), funded by the National Institute of
Justice.
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* Awareness of community mental health and social service resources and
their availability; and
* The officer's attitudes toward the mentally ill and this aspect of police
work. 4 '

Law enforcement policy could be sharpened; officers could receive training on
the recognition of mental illness and alternative dispositions; law enforcement
agencies could work closely with mental health care agencies to effectuate diversion and treatment.
In conclusion, jails and prisons likely will remain the major repositories of persons with serious mental illness, at least that portion of the population that cannot afford other routes to mental health care and who cannot avoid the criminal
justice system. That group, of course, are the poor; the visible among us who act
out their illness on a public stage. There is always the dilemma of improving care
in an inhospitable environment to the point that more worthy alternatives - diversion, expansion of criminal irresponsibility - are not vigorously pursued.
On the other hand, how can we ignore the hundreds of thousands of persons
with mental illness who enter and leave penal confinement? And how can we fail
to work to make things better?

41

Murphy, supra note 40.

